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10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
11 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

12 BARAK FEDERMAN, individually
13 and on behalf of all others similarly
14 situated,

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 CEREBRAL INC., a Delaware
18 corporation,

19 Defendant.

Case No. _____

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1
2 Plaintiff Barak Federman ("Plaintiff") brings this Class Complaint against
3 Cerebral Inc. ("Cerebral" or "Defendant") and alleges, upon personal knowledge as
4 to his own actions, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:
5

6 **JURISDICTION**

7 1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action
8 Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), because the aggregate amount in
9 controversy exceeds \$5 million, exclusive of interest and costs; and minimal diversity
10 exists because at least one class member, including Plaintiff, and Defendant are
11 citizens of different states.
12

13 2. This Court has federal question jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1331
14 because this Complaint alleges violations of the ECPA (28 U.S.C. § 2511, *et seq.*, and
15 28 U.S.C. § 2702) and the CFAA (18 U.S.C. § 1030, *et seq.*).
16

17 3. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because its principal
18 place of business is in this District and the many of the acts and omissions giving rise
19 to Plaintiff's claims occurred in and emanated from this District.
20

21 **PARTIES**

22 ***Plaintiff Barak Federman***

23 4. Plaintiff Barak Federman is a citizen and resident of New York.
24

25 5. Plaintiff Federman has received healthcare services from Defendant
26 since 2022 and accessed those services via Defendant's website and mobile
27
28

1 applications (“Digital Platforms”). While using Defendant’s Digital Platforms,
2 Plaintiff communicated sensitive, and what he presumed to be confidential, personal
3 and medical information to Defendant.
4

5 6. Plaintiff Federman used Defendant’s Digital Platforms to communicate
6 with healthcare providers, research particular medical concerns and treatments, fill
7 out forms and questionnaires, schedule and attend appointments, and perform other
8 tasks related to his specific medical inquiries.
9

10 7. In the course of using Defendant’s services, Plaintiff provided his name,
11 phone number, email address, date of birth, and other PII. As a result of the Tracking
12 Pixel Defendant chose to install on its Digital Platforms, this information was
13 intercepted, viewed analyzed, and used by unauthorized third parties.
14
15

16 8. In the course of using Defendant’s services, Plaintiff answered
17 Cerebral’s online mental health self-assessment and communicated information
18 regarding his particular health condition and concerns and other PHI. As a result of
19 the Tracking Pixel Defendant chose to install on its Digital Platforms, this information
20 was intercepted, viewed analyzed, and used by unauthorized third parties.
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22

23 9. In the course of using Defendant’s services, Plaintiff communicated to
24 and received from Defendant information regarding his appointments, treatments,
25 clinical information, health insurance and pharmacy information, and insurance
26 information. As a result of the Tracking Pixel Defendant chose to install on its Digital
27
28

1 Platforms, this information was intercepted, viewed analyzed, and used by
2 unauthorized third parties.

3
4 10. Plaintiff Federman has been a Cerebral user since 2022.

5 11. Plaintiff Federman accessed Defendant's Digital Platforms to receive
6 healthcare services from Defendant or Defendant's affiliates at Defendant's direction
7 and with Defendant's encouragement.

8
9 12. As Defendant's patient, Plaintiff Federman reasonably expected that his
10 online communications with Defendant were solely between himself and Defendant,
11 and that such communications would not be transmitted or intercepted by a third
12 party. Plaintiff Federman also relied on Defendant's Privacy Policies in reasonably
13 expecting Defendant would safeguard his Private Information. But for his status as
14 Defendant's patient and Defendant's representations via its Privacy Policies, Plaintiff
15 Federman would not have disclosed his Private Information to Defendant.
16

17
18 13. During his time as Defendant's patient, Plaintiff Federman never
19 consented to the use of his Private Information by third parties or to Defendant
20 enabling third parties, including Facebook, Google, TikToK, and others to access or
21 interpret such information.
22

23
24 14. Notwithstanding, through the Tracking Pixel and similar technologies
25 embedded on Defendant's Digital Platforms, Defendant transmitted Plaintiff
26 Federman's Private Information to third parties, including Facebook, Google,
27 TikTok, and others.
28

1 15. Facebook, Google, TikTok, and others offer code to website and mobile
2 application operators, like Defendant, to integrate into their platforms. When a user
3 accesses a platform hosting the Pixel, the Pixel's software script surreptitiously directs
4 the user's browser to send a separate message to a third party's servers during their
5 interaction with the webpage. This second, secret transmission contains the original
6 GET request sent to the host website, along with additional data that the Pixel is
7 configured to collect. This transmission is initiated by the code concurrently with the
8 communications with the host website. Two sets of code are thus automatically run
9 as part of the browser's attempt to load and read Defendant's Websites—Defendant's
10 own code, and the Pixel embedded code.

14 16. After intercepting and collecting this information, Facebook, Google,
15 TikTok, and others view it, process it, analyze it, and assimilate it into data sets used
16 to target consumers with advertising.

18 17. The Private Information of Plaintiff's and Class Members' that was
19 unlawfully intercepted and transmitted by Defendant includes: names, phone
20 numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, IP addresses, Cerebral client ID numbers,
21 and other demographic or information.

24 18. According to the report Defendant submitted to the United States
25 Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant admits that the Private
26 Information of at least 3,000,000 individuals was improperly and unlawfully
27

1 disclosed to Facebook, Google, TikTok, and others without those individuals'
2 knowledge or consent.

3
4 19. Plaintiff brings this complaint to address Defendant's transmission and
5 disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' confidential personally identifiable
6 information ("PII") and protected health information ("PHI") (collectively referred to
7 as "Private Information" or "PII and PHI") to Meta Platforms, Inc. d/b/a Meta
8 ("Facebook") and/or Google LLC d/b/a Google ("Google") via a tracking pixel
9 ("Tracking Pixel" or "Pixel") installed on Defendant's website.
10

11
12 ***Defendant Cerebral Inc.***

13 20. Defendant Cerebral Inc. is a healthcare company incorporated in
14 Delaware with its principal place of business and headquarters located at 340
15 S. Lemon Ave., #9892, Walnut, California, 91789.
16

17 **VENUE**

18 21. Venue is proper under 18 U.S.C § 1391(b)(1) because Defendant's
19 principal place of business is in this District and a substantial part of the acts and
20 omissions complained of herein took place in this District.
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NATURE OF THE ACTION

22. Defendant is a healthcare corporation headquartered in California. Defendant " offers long-term online care and medication management for a wide range of mental health conditions."¹

23. Plaintiff brings this case to address Defendant's transmission and disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' confidential personally identifiable information ("PII") and protected health information ("PHI") (collectively referred to as "Private Information") to Meta Platforms, Inc. d/b/a Meta ("Facebook") and/or Google LLC d/b/a Google ("Google") via a tracking pixel ("Tracking Pixel" or "Pixel") installed on Defendant's website.

24. Defendant unlawfully intercepted and transmitted Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information including their: names, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, IP addresses, Cerebral client ID numbers, and demographic and other information.

25. In order to provide medical treatment and care, Defendant collects and stores its patients' Private Information and medical records. In doing so, Defendant has statutory, regulatory, contractual, fiduciary, and common law duties to safeguard that Private Information from disclosure and ensure that it remains private and confidential. Defendant is duty bound to maintain the confidentiality of patient

¹ https://cerebral.com/faqs#General_questions-How_does_Cerebral_work_ (last visited Mar. 9, 2023).

1 medical records and information and is further required to do so by the Health
2 Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”).²

3
4 26. According to a report Defendant submitted to the United States
5 Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant admits that the Private
6 Information of at least 3,000,000 individuals was improperly and unlawfully
7 disclosed to Facebook and Google without those individuals’ knowledge or consent.³
8

9 27. Plaintiff and Class Members are individuals who are seeking or have
10 sought medical services and/or treatment from Defendant. Defendant advertises its
11 online services on its Digital Platforms and elsewhere to assist patients with their
12 medical care. Based on Defendant’s solicitations that patients use its online services,
13 Plaintiff used Defendant’s Website to communicate with healthcare providers,
14 research particular medical concerns and treatments, fill out forms and questionnaires,
15 schedule and attend appointments, and perform other tasks related to his particular
16 medical concerns.
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24 ² The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub.
25 L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), (“HIPAA”), and regulations of the United
26 States Department of Health and Services (“HHS”) promulgated thereunder, are
27 designed to protect the confidentiality and guard against the unauthorized disclosure
28 of medical records, patient health care information, and other individually
identifiable healthcare information.

³ https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf (last visited Mar. 9, 2023).

1 28. Defendant’s Privacy Policies (“Privacy Policies”) unequivocally state
2 that Defendant will not share Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information for
3 marketing purposes unless patients provide written permission.⁴
4

5 29. As explained below, however, Defendant did disclose Plaintiff’s and
6 Class Members’ Private Information via the Tracking Pixel and other technologies to
7 third parties, such as Facebook, Google, TikTok, and others. Defendant’s disclosure
8 of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information constitutes a gross violation of
9 common law and statutory data privacy laws.
10

11 30. Despite warnings that healthcare organizations were disclosing Private
12 Information to digital marketing companies by incorporating the Tracking Pixel and
13 similar technologies as far back as June of 2022,⁵ Defendant did not acknowledge the
14 Tracking Pixel and its widespread and blatant disclosures of Plaintiff’s and Class
15 Members’ Private Information until on or around March 6, 2023.⁶
16

17 31. On or about March 6, 2023, Defendant posted a Statement (hereinafter
18 referred to as the “Notice Letter”) on its website, which states the following:
19

20 Cerebral Inc. (“Cerebral”) takes your privacy seriously. We write to provide
21 transparency regarding Cerebral’s prior data sharing practices via Tracking
22 Technologies (as defined below) on portions of its websites and mobile
23 applications (“Cerebral’s Platforms”) and with certain subcontractors and
24 other service providers (“Subcontractors”).

25 ⁴ <https://cerebral.com/privacy-policy> (last visited Mar. 9, 2023).

26 ⁵ [https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-](https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-medical-information-from-hospital-websites)
27 [medical-information-from-hospital-websites](https://themarkup.org/pixel-hunt/2022/06/16/facebook-is-receiving-sensitive-medical-information-from-hospital-websites)

28 ⁶ : https://cerebral.com/static/hippa_privacy_breach-4000c6eb21449c2ecd8bd13706750cc2.pdf

What Happened?

Like others in many industries, including health systems, traditional brick and mortar providers, and other telehealth companies, Cerebral has used what are called “pixels” and similar common technologies (“Tracking Technologies”), such as those made available by Google, Meta (Facebook), TikTok, and other third parties (“Third Party Platforms”), on Cerebral’s Platforms. Cerebral has used Tracking Technologies since we began operations on October 12, 2019. Cerebral recently initiated a review of its use of Tracking Technologies and data sharing practices involving Subcontractors. On January 3, 2023, Cerebral determined that it had disclosed certain information that may be regulated as protected health information (“PHI”) under HIPAA to certain Third Party Platforms and some Subcontractors without having obtained HIPAA-required assurances.

What Information Was Involved?

The information disclosed varied depending on what actions you took on Cerebral’s Platforms, the nature of the services provided by the Subcontractors, the configuration of Tracking Technologies when you used our services, the data capture configurations of the Third-Party Platforms, how you configured your device and browser, and other factors.

- If you created a Cerebral account, the information disclosed may have included your name, phone number, email address, date of birth, IP address, Cerebral client ID number, and other demographic or information.
- If, in addition to creating a Cerebral account, you also completed any portion of Cerebral’s online mental health self-assessment, the information disclosed may also have included your selected service, assessment responses, and certain associated health information.
- If, in addition to creating a Cerebral account and completing Cerebral’s online mental health self-assessment, you also purchased a subscription plan from Cerebral, the information disclosed may also have included subscription plan type, appointment dates and other booking information, treatment, and other clinical information, health

1 insurance/ pharmacy benefit information (for example, plan name
2 and group/ member numbers), and insurance co-pay amount.⁷

3 32. Parsing out Defendant's Notice Letter, Defendant has admitted that its
4 Website contain a Tracking Pixel that secretly enabled the unauthorized transmission
5 and disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to third parties
6 such as Facebook, Google, TikTok and others.

8 33. The Private Information that Defendant discloses through the Tracking
9 Pixel and similar technologies is valuable to internet marketing companies like
10 Facebook, Google, TikTok, and others as they receive, view, analyze, and aggregate
11 the information to build consumer profiles to assist advertisers in targeting desired
12 demographics.
13

14 34. Accordingly, the purpose of this lawsuit is to protect Plaintiff's and Class
15 Members' right to protect their Private Information, to choose who receives it and
16 how it is used, and to seek remedies for the harm caused by Defendant's intentional,
17 reckless, or negligent disclosure to unauthorized third parties.
18

19 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

20 *Background.*

21 35. A pixel is a piece of code that "tracks the people and [the] type of actions
22 they take."⁸ Pixels are routinely used to target specific customers by utilizing the data
23

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27 ⁷ *Id.*

28 ⁸ FACEBOOK, RETARGETING,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/goals/retargeting> (last visited Nov. 14, 2022).

1 gathered through Defendant's pixel to build profiles for the purposes of retargeting
2 and future marketing.⁹ The Tracking Pixel is embedded on Defendant's Digital
3 Platforms such that when a visitor interacts with the Digital Application two signals
4 are sent in tandem, one to the intended recipient, Defendant, and another to the
5 unauthorized recipient.
6

7
8 36. Accordingly, when an individual visits Defendant's Digital Platforms
9 and communicates Private Information to Defendant, the Tracking Pixel allows
10 unauthorized to listen in to Plaintiff's and Class Member's communications with
11 Defendant in real time, i.e., they receive the communication as it is communicated to
12 Defendant.
13

14 37. Defendant acknowledges that the aggregate information captured by the
15 Tracking Pixel and disclosed to unauthorized parties includes both identifying
16 information, like names and dates of birth, and medical information. The recipients
17 of this data are able to associate information communicated across multiple visits to
18 the Digital Platforms by capturing persistent identifiers like IP addresses, browser
19 fingerprints, and device IDs.
20
21

22 38. Facebook Google, TikTok and others also use cookies installed on
23 Plaintiff's and Class Members' browser to associate Private Information with
24
25

26 ⁹ "Retargeting" or "remarketing" is a form of advertising that displays ads or sends
27 emails to previous visitors of a particular website who did not "convert" the visit into
28 a sale or otherwise meet a marketing goal of the website owner.

1 particular individuals. For example, with respect to Facebook, the persistent Tracking
2 Pixel on Defendant's Website causes that individual's unique and persistent Facebook
3 ID ("FID") to be transmitted alongside other Private Information that is sent to
4 Facebook.
5

6 39. Upon information and belief, Defendant utilized the Pixel data to
7 improve and save costs on its marketing campaign, improve its data analytics, attract
8 new patients, and market new services and/or treatments to its existing patients. In
9 other words, Defendant implemented the Tracking Pixel to bolster its profits.
10

11 40. Pixels are routinely used to target advertising to specific consumers by
12 utilizing the data gathered through the pixel to build profiles for the purposes of
13 retargeting and future marketing.
14

15 41. In this context, the Tracking Pixel is designed to transmit to third parties
16 data gathered about the web page currently visited and any information to/from the
17 User to the web page. In other words, a pixel creates a link – hidden from the Digital
18 Platform's user – that transfers information sent to/from the web page to the third
19 party.
20

21 42. Operating as designed, Defendant's Tracking Pixel allowed the Private
22 Information that Plaintiff and Class Members communicated to Defendant to be
23 unlawfully disclosed to third parties.
24

25 43. For example, when Plaintiff or a Class Member accessed Defendant's
26 Website hosting the Pixel, the Pixel software directed Plaintiff's or Class Members'
27
28

1 browser to send a message to the third party's servers alongside the message intended
2 for Defendant's server. The information sent to third parties by Defendant included
3 the Private Information that Plaintiff and Class Members submitted to Defendant's
4 Digital Platform. Such Private Information would allow the third party (e.g.,
5 Facebook or Google) to know that a specific patient was seeking confidential medical
6 care and the type of medical care being sought.
7

8
9 44. The third party, in turn, sells Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private
10 Information to third-party marketers who online target¹⁰ Plaintiff and Class Members
11 based on communications obtained via the Tracking Pixel.
12

13 45. Plaintiff submitted personal and medical information to Defendant's
14 Digital Platforms and used the Digital Platforms to communicate with healthcare
15 providers, research particular medical concerns and treatments, fill out forms and
16 questionnaires, schedule and attend appointments, and perform other tasks related to
17 his particular medical concerns.
18

19
20 46. Via the Tracking Pixel, Defendant transmitted this Private Information
21 to third parties, such as Facebook and Google.
22
23
24

25 ¹⁰ "Online Targeting" is "a process that refers to creating advertisement elements
26 that specifically reach out to prospects and customers interested in offerings. A
27 target audience has certain traits, demographics, and other characteristics, based on
28 products or services the advertiser is promoting." See
[https://digitalmarketinggroup.com/a-guide-to-onlinetargeting-which-works-for-](https://digitalmarketinggroup.com/a-guide-to-onlinetargeting-which-works-for-your-business/)
your-business/ (last visited: January 23, 2023).

1 47. Defendant regularly encouraged Plaintiff and Class Members to use its
2 digital tools, including its Website, to receive healthcare services. In doing so,
3 Defendant also directed Plaintiff and Class Members to its Privacy Policies, which
4 preclude the transmission or disclosure of Private Information to unauthorized third
5 parties, such as Facebook or Google.
6

7
8 48. Plaintiff and Class Members provided Private Information to Defendant
9 in order to receive medical services and with the reasonable expectation that
10 Defendant would protect their Private Information.
11

12 49. At all times that Plaintiff and Class Members visited and utilized
13 Defendant's Digital Platforms, they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
14 Private Information collected through Defendant's Digital Platforms, including that it
15 would remain secure and protected and only utilized for necessary purposes.
16 Plaintiff's and Class Members' expectations were entirely reasonable because (1) they
17 are patients; and (2) Defendant is a healthcare provider which is required by common
18 and statutory law to protect its patients' Private Information. Moreover, Plaintiff and
19 Class Members also relied on Defendant's Privacy Policies, which do not permit the
20 transmission or disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to
21 unauthorized third parties.
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25 50. Defendant further made express and implied promises to protect
26 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information and maintain the privacy and
27 confidentiality of communications that they exchange with Defendant. Instead,
28

1 Defendant chose to exchange the Private Information to optimize the delivery of its
2 ads, measure cross-device conversions, create custom advertising groups or
3 “audiences,” learn about the use of its Digital Platforms, and decrease advertising and
4 marketing costs.¹¹

5
6 51. Defendant owed common law, contractual, statutory, and regulatory
7 duties to keep Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information safe, secure, and
8 confidential. Furthermore, by obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from
9 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information, Defendant assumed legal and
10 equitable duties to those individuals to protect and safeguard that information from
11 unauthorized disclosure.
12

13
14 52. However, as set forth more fully below, Defendant failed in its
15 obligations and promises by utilizing the Tracking Pixel on its Digital Platforms
16 knowing that such technology would transmit and disclose Plaintiff's and Class
17 Members' Private Information to unauthorized third parties.
18

19
20 53. The exposed Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members can—
21 and likely will—be further disseminated to additional third parties utilizing the data
22 for retargeting or to insurance companies utilizing the information to set insurance
23 rates.
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¹¹ *Id.*

1 54. While Defendant willfully and intentionally incorporated the Tracking
2 Pixel into its Digital Platforms, Defendant did not disclose to Plaintiff or Class
3 Members that it shared their sensitive and confidential communications via the
4 Tracking Pixel to Facebook or Google until on or around March 6, 2023.

5
6 55. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members were unaware that their Private
7 Information was being surreptitiously transmitted and/or disclosed to Facebook and
8 Google as they communicated with their healthcare provider via the Digital Platforms.

9
10 56. Defendant breached its obligations in one or more of the following ways:
11
12 (i) failing to adequately review its marketing programs and web based technology to
13 ensure Defendant's Website was safe and secure; (ii) failing to remove or disengage
14 technology that was known and designed to share web-users' information; (iii) failing
15 to obtain the consent from Plaintiff and Class Members before disclosing their Private
16 Information to Facebook, Google, or others; (iv) failing to take steps to block the
17 transmission of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information through Tracking
18 Pixels; and (v) otherwise failing to design and monitor its Website to maintain the
19 confidentiality and integrity of patient Private Information.

20
21
22 57. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered injury as a result of
23 Defendant's conduct. These injuries include: (i) invasion of privacy, (ii) loss of
24 control over their Private Information, (iii) diminution of value of the Private
25 Information, (iv) statutory damages, and (v) the continued and ongoing risk of
26 exposure and use of their Private Information by marketing companies.
27
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1 ***Defendant Improperly Disclosed Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private***
2 ***Information via the Tracking Pixel.***

3 58. Defendant incorporated Tracking Pixels and similar technology to better
4 understand the efficacy of its marketing efforts, how users interact with their Digital
5 Platforms and to attract users like Plaintiff and Class Members to Defendant's Digital
6 Platforms with the ultimate goal of increasing profitability. The Pixel and similar
7 technologies were invisible to Plaintiff and Class Members and unbeknownst to them
8 were used to secretly track their interactions by simultaneously transmitting their
9 activity to third party tracking technology providers.
10

11
12 59. While seeking and using Defendant's services as a medical provider, and
13 utilizing the Website, Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information was
14 intercepted in real time and then disseminated to Facebook, Google, TikTok, and
15 other third parties, via the Pixel that Defendant secretly installed on its Website.
16

17
18 60. Plaintiff and Class Members did not intend or have any reason to suspect
19 their Private Information would be shared with third parties, or that Defendant was
20 tracking their every communication and disclosing the same to third parties when they
21 entered highly sensitive information on Defendant's Digital Platforms.
22

23 61. Defendant did not disclose to or warn Plaintiff or Class Members that
24 Defendant used Plaintiff's and Class Members' confidential electronic medical
25 communications and Private Information for marketing purposes.
26
27
28

1 62. Defendant tracked Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information
2 via the Tracking Pixel.

3
4 63. Plaintiff and Class Members never consented, agreed, authorized, or
5 otherwise permitted Defendant to disclose their Private Information.

6 64. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private
7 Information, which has an inherent market value as evidenced by its marketing value,
8 has been damaged and diminished by its unauthorized release to Facebook, Google,
9 TikTok, and others, to whom it is now available and holds significant value. However,
10 this transfer of value occurred without any consideration paid to Plaintiff or Class
11 Members for their property, resulting in an economic loss. Moreover, the Private
12 Information is now readily available, and the rarity of the Data has been lost, thereby
13 causing additional loss of value.

14
15
16
17 65. Defendant also deprived Plaintiff and Class Members of their privacy
18 rights when it: (1) implemented technology (i.e., the Tracking Pixel) that
19 surreptitiously tracked, recorded, and disclosed Plaintiff's and other online patients'
20 confidential communications and Private Information; (2) disclosed patients'
21 protected information to Facebook, Google, and/or other unauthorized third-parties;
22 and (3) undertook this pattern of conduct without notifying Plaintiff or Class Members
23 and without obtaining their express written consent.
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1 ***Defendant's Pixel, Source Code, and Interception of HTTP Requests.***

2 66. Web browsers are software applications that allow consumers to
3 navigate the web and view and exchange electronic information and communications
4 over the internet. Each “client device” (such as computer, tablet, or smart phone)
5 accessed web content through a web browser (e.g., Google’s Chrome browser,
6 Mozilla’s Firefox browser, Apple’s Safari browser, and Microsoft’s Edge browser).
7

8 67. Every website is hosted by a computer “server” that holds the website’s
9 contents and through which the entity in charge of the website exchanges
10 communications with Internet users’ client devices via their web browsers.
11

12 68. Web communications consist of HTTP Requests and HTTP Responses,
13 and any given browsing session may consist of thousands of individual HTTP
14 Requests and HTTP Responses, along with corresponding cookies:
15

- 16
- 17 • **HTTP Request:** an electronic communication sent from the client
18 device’s browser to the website’s server. GET Requests are one of the
19 most common types of HTTP Requests. In addition to specifying a
20 particular URL (i.e., web address), GET Requests can also send data to
21 the host server embedded inside the URL, and can include cookies.
22
 - 23 • **Cookies:** a small text file that can be used to store information on the
24 client device which can later be communicated to a server or servers.
25 Cookies are sent with HTTP Requests from client devices to the host
26 server. Some cookies are “third-party cookies” which means they can
27
28

1 store and communicate data when visiting one website to an entirely
2 different website.

- 3
- 4 • **HTTP Response:** an electronic communication that is sent as a reply to
5 the client device's web browser from the host server in response to an
6 HTTP Request. HTTP Responses may consist of a web page, another
7 kind of file, text information, or error codes, among other data.
8

9 69. A patient's HTTP Request essentially asks Defendant's Website to
10 retrieve certain information (such as a physician's "Book an Appointment" page), and
11 the HTTP Response renders or loads the requested information in the form of
12 "Markup" (the pages, images, words, buttons, and other features that appear on the
13 patient's screen as they navigate Defendant's Webpage(s)).
14
15

16 70. Every webpage is comprised of Markup and "Source Code." Source
17 Code is a set of instructions invisible to the website's visitor that commands the
18 visitor's browser to take certain actions when the webpage first loads or when a
19 specified event triggers the code.
20

21 71. Source code may also command a web browser to send data
22 transmissions to third parties in the form of HTTP Requests quietly executed in the
23 background without notifying the web browser's user. Defendant's Pixel is source
24 code that does just that. The Pixel acts much like a traditional wiretap. When patients
25 visit Defendant's Digital Platforms via an HTTP Request to Defendant's server,
26 Defendant's server sends an HTTP Response including the Markup that displays the
27
28

1 page of the Digital Platforms visible to the user and Source Code, including
2 Defendant's Pixel. Thus, Defendant is in essence handing patients a tapped phone,
3 and once the Webpage is loaded into the patient's browser, the software-based wiretap
4 is quietly waiting for private communications on the Webpage to trigger the tap,
5 which intercepts those communications intended only for Defendant and transmits
6 those communications to third-parties, including Facebook, Google, TikTok, and
7 others.
8

9
10 72. After intercepting and collecting this information, Facebook, Google,
11 TikTok, and others view it, process it, analyze it, and assimilate it into datasets. These
12 datasets allow marketing companies to build intimate profiles concerning an
13 individual's interests, habits, and as here, their concerns or health issues.
14

15
16 73. Third-parties, like Facebook, Google, TikTok, and others, place third-
17 party cookies in the web browsers of users logged into their services. These cookies
18 uniquely identify the user and are sent with each intercepted communication to ensure
19 the third-party can uniquely identify the patient associated with the Private
20 Information intercepted.
21

22
23 74. With substantial work and technical know-how, internet users can
24 sometimes circumvent this browser-based wiretap technology. This is why third
25 parties bent on gathering Private Information, like Facebook, implement workarounds
26 that cannot be evaded by savvy users. Facebook's workaround, for example, is called
27 Conversions API. Conversions API is an effective workaround because it does not
28

1 intercept data communicated from the user’s browser. Instead, Conversions API “is
2 designed to create a direct connection between [Web hosts’] marketing data and
3 [Facebook].” Thus, the communications between patients and Defendant, which are
4 necessary to use Defendant’s Website, are actually received by Defendant and stored
5 on its server before Conversions API collects and sends the Private Information
6 contained in those communications directly from Defendant to Facebook. Client
7 devices do not have access to host servers and thus cannot prevent (or even detect)
8 this transmission.
9

10
11
12 75. While there is no way to confirm with certainty that a Web host like
13 Defendant has implemented workarounds like Conversions API without access to the
14 host server, companies like Facebook instruct Defendant to “[u]se the Conversions
15 API in addition to the [] Pixel, and share the same events using both tools,” because
16 such a “redundant event setup” allows Defendant “to share website events [with
17 Facebook] that the pixel may lose.”¹² Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Facebook’s
18 customers who implement the Tracking Pixel in accordance with Facebook’s
19 documentation will also implement the Conversions API workaround.
20
21

22 76. The third parties to whom a website transmits data through pixels and
23 associated workarounds do not provide any substantive content relating to the user’s
24
25
26

27 ¹² See

28 <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/308855623839366?id=818859032317965>
(last visited Jan. 23, 2023).

1 communications. Instead, these third parties are typically procured to track user data
2 and communications for marketing purposes of the website owner.

3
4 77. Thus, without any knowledge, authorization, or action by a user, a
5 website owner like Defendant can use its source code to commandeer the user's
6 computing device, causing the device to contemporaneously and invisibly re-direct
7 the users' communications to third parties.
8

9 78. In this case, Defendant employed just such devices (the Tracking Pixel
10 and similar technologies) to intercept, duplicate, and re-direct Plaintiff's and Class
11 Members' Private Information to third parties like Facebook and Google.
12

13 ***Defendant's Privacy Policies and Promises***

14 79. Defendant's Privacy Policies unequivocally state Defendant will not
15 share Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information for marketing purposes
16 unless patients provide written permission.¹³
17

18 80. Plaintiff and Class Members have not provided Defendant with written
19 permission to share their Private Information for marketing purposes.
20

21 81. Despite Defendant's acknowledgement that it will not share Plaintiff's
22 and Class Members' Private Information, Defendant, in fact, shared Plaintiff's and
23 Class Members' Private Information via the Tracking Pixel.
24

25
26
27
28

¹³ *Id.*

1 82. Specifically, Defendant transmitted and/or disclosed Plaintiff's and Class
2 Members' Private Information to third parties, like Facebook and Google, without
3 Plaintiff's and Class Members' consent or written permission.
4

5 83. In doing so, Defendant intended to improve and save costs on its
6 marketing campaign, improve its data analytics, attract new patients, and market new
7 services and/or treatments to its existing patients.
8

9 84. In simple terms, Defendant violated its own Privacy Policy—i.e., the
10 Privacy Policy that Plaintiff and Class Members relied upon—in order to bolster its
11 profits. Defendant Violated HIPAA Standards
12

13 ***Defendant Violated HIPAA Standards.***

14 85. Under Federal Law, a healthcare provider may not disclose personally
15 identifiable, non-public medical information about a patient, a potential patient, or
16 household member of a patient for marketing purposes without the patients' express
17 written authorization.¹⁴
18
19

20 86. Guidance from the United States Department of Health and Human
21 Services instructs healthcare providers that patient status alone is protected by
22 HIPAA.
23
24
25
26
27

28 ¹⁴ HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502; 164.508(a)(3), 164.514(b)(2)(i).

1 87. In Guidance regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health
 2 Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
 3 Act Privacy Rule, the Department instructs:
 4

5 Identifying information alone, such as personal names, residential addresses,
 6 or phone numbers, would not necessarily be designated as PHI. For instance,
 7 if such information was reported as part of a publicly accessible data source,
 8 such as a phone book, then this information would not be PHI because it is
 9 not related to health data... If such information was listed with health
 10 condition, health care provision, or payment data, such as an indication that
 the individual was treated at a certain clinic, then this information would be
 PHI.¹⁵

11 88. In its guidance for Marketing, the Department further instructs:

12 The HIPAA Privacy Rule gives individuals important controls over whether
 13 and how their protected health information is used and disclosed for
 14 marketing purposes. With limited exceptions, the Rule requires an
 15 individual's written authorization before a use or disclosure of his or his
 16 protected health information can be made for marketing. ... Simply put, a
 covered entity may not sell protected health information to a business
 17 associate or any other third party for that party's own purposes. Moreover,
 18 *covered entities may not sell lists of patients to third parties without obtaining
 authorization from each person on the list.* (Emphasis added).¹⁶

19 89. In addition, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the U.S. Department of
 20 Health and Human Services (HHS) has issued a Bulletin to highlight the obligations
 21 of HIPAA covered entities and business associates ("regulated entities") under the
 22
 23
 24
 25
 26

27 ¹⁵[https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/covereden
 28 tities/Deidentification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/Deidentification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf) (last visited Nov. 3, 2022)

¹⁶ *Id.*

1 HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules (“HIPAA Rules”) when
2 using online tracking technologies (“tracking technologies”).¹⁷
3

4 90. The Bulletin expressly provides that “[r]egulated entities are not
5 permitted to use tracking technologies in a manner that would result in impermissible
6 disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors or any other violations of the
7 HIPAA Rules.”
8

9 91. In other words, HHS has expressly stated that Defendant has violated
10 HIPAA Rules by implementing the Tracking Pixel.
11

12 ***Defendant Violated Industry Standards.***

13 92. A medical provider’s duty of confidentiality is a cardinal rule and is
14 embedded in the physician-patient and hospital-patient relationship.
15

16 93. The American Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Code of Medical Ethics
17 contains numerous rules protecting the privacy of patient data and communications.
18

19 94. AMA Code of Ethics Opinion 3.1.1 provides:

20 Protecting information gathered in association with the care of the patient is a
21 core value in health care... Patient privacy encompasses a number of aspects,
22 including, ... personal data (informational privacy)

23 95. AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 3.2.4 provides:

24 Information gathered and recorded in association with the care of the patient
25 is confidential. Patients are entitled to expect that the sensitive personal
26 information they divulge will be used solely to enable their physician to most
27 effectively provide needed services. Disclosing information for commercial

28 ¹⁷ See <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/hipaa-online-tracking/index.html>.

1 purposes without consent undermines trust, violates principles of informed
 2 consent and confidentiality, and may harm the integrity of the patient-
 3 physician relationship. Physicians who propose to permit third-party access to
 4 specific patient information for commercial purposes should: (a) Only provide
 5 data that has been de-identified. [and] (b) Fully inform each patient whose
 6 record would be involved (or the patient's authorized surrogate when the
 7 individual lacks decision-making capacity about the purposes for which
 8 access would be granted. 176. AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 3.3.2
 9 provides: Information gathered and recorded in association with the care of a
 10 patient is confidential, regardless of the form in which it is collected or stored.
 11 Physicians who collect or store patient information electronically...must...:(c
 12) release patient information only in keeping ethics guidelines for
 13 confidentiality.

14 ***Plaintiff's and Class Members' Expectation of Privacy.***

15 96. Plaintiff and Class Members were aware of Defendant's duty of
 16 confidentiality when they sought medical services from Defendant.

17 97. Indeed, at all times when Plaintiff and Class Members provided their PII
 18 and PHI to Defendant, they all had a reasonable expectation that the information
 19 would remain private and that Defendant would not share the Private Information with
 20 third parties for a commercial purpose, unrelated to patient care.

21 ***IP Addresses are Personally Identifiable Information.***

22 98. On information and belief, through the use of the Tracking Pixels on
 23 Defendant's Website, Defendant also disclosed and otherwise assisted Facebook,
 24 Google, and/or other third parties with intercepting Plaintiff's and Class Members'
 25 Computer IP addresses.

26 99. An IP address is a number that identifies the address of a device
 27 connected to the Internet.
 28

1 100. IP addresses are used to identify and route communications on the
2 Internet.

3
4 101. IP addresses of individual Internet users are used by Internet service
5 providers, Websites, and third-party tracking companies to facilitate and track Internet
6 communications.

7
8 102. Facebook tracks every IP address ever associated with a Facebook user.

9 184. Google also tracks IP addresses associated with Internet users.

10 103. Facebook, Google, and other third-party marketing companies track IP
11 addresses for use in tracking and targeting individual homes and their occupants with
12 advertising by using IP addresses.

13
14 104. Under HIPAA, an IP address is considered personally identifiable
15 information:

- 16
17 a. HIPAA defines personally identifiable information to include
18 “any unique identifying number, characteristic or code” and
19 specifically lists the example of IP addresses. *See* 45 C.F.R. §
20 164.514(2).
21
22 b. HIPAA further declares information as personally
23 identifiable where the covered entity has “actual knowledge
24 that the information to identify an individual who is a
25 subject of the information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(2)(ii); *See*
26 also, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(O).
27
28

1 105. Consequently, by disclosing IP addresses, Defendant's business
2 practices violated HIPAA and industry privacy standards.

3
4 ***Defendant was Enriched and Benefitted from the Use of the Pixel and***
5 ***Unauthorized Disclosures.***

6 106. The sole purpose of the use of the Tracking Pixel on Defendant's
7 Website was to increase marketing efficacy and ultimately profits.

8 107. In exchange for disclosing the Private Information of its patients,
9 Defendant is compensated by third parties, like Facebook and Google, in the form of
10 the use of the Tracking Pixel and similar technologies.

11
12 108. Retargeting is a form of online marketing that targets users with ads
13 based on their previous internet communications and interactions.

14
15 109. Upon information and belief, as part of its marketing campaign,
16 Defendant re-targeted patients and potential patients, including Plaintiff and Class
17 Members.

18
19 110. By utilizing the Pixel, the cost of advertising and retargeting was
20 reduced, thereby benefitting Defendant.

21
22 ***Defendant Unlawfully Disclosed Plaintiff's Private Information to Facebook and***
23 ***other Third Parties.***

24 ***Plaintiff Barak Federman***

25 111. Plaintiff Barak Federman entrusted his Private Information to Defendant.
26 As a condition of receiving Defendant's services, Plaintiff Federman disclosed his
27 Private Information to Defendant.
28

1 112. Plaintiff Federman accessed Defendant's Digital Platforms to receive
2 healthcare services from Defendant and at Defendant's solicitation.

3
4 113. Plaintiff Federman used Defendant's Digital Platforms to communicate
5 with healthcare providers, research particular medical concerns and treatments, fill
6 out forms and questionnaires, schedule and attend appointments, and perform other
7 tasks related to his particular medical concerns.

8
9 114. In the course of using Defendant's services, Plaintiff provided his name,
10 phone number, email address, date of birth, and other PII. As a result of the Tracking
11 Pixel Defendant chose to install on its Digital Platforms, this information was
12 intercepted, viewed analyzed, and used by unauthorized third parties.

13
14 115. In the course of using Defendant's services, Plaintiff answered
15 Defendant's online mental health self-assessment and communicated information
16 regarding his particular health condition and concerns and other PHI. As a result of
17 the Tracking Pixel Defendant chose to install on its Digital Platforms, this information
18 was intercepted, viewed analyzed, and used by unauthorized third parties.

19
20
21 116. In the course of using Defendant's services, Plaintiff communicated to
22 and received from Defendant information regarding his appointments, treatments,
23 clinical information, health insurance and pharmacy information, and insurance
24 information. As a result of the Tracking Pixel Defendant chose to install on its Digital
25 Platforms, this information was intercepted, viewed analyzed, and used by
26 unauthorized third parties.
27
28

1 117. Plaintiff Federman reasonably expected that his communications with
2 Defendant via the Website were confidential, solely between himself and Defendant,
3 and that such communications would not be transmitted to or intercepted by a third
4 party.
5

6 118. Plaintiff Federman provided his Private Information to Defendant and
7 trusted that the information would be safeguarded according to Defendant's policies
8 and state and federal law.
9

10 119. As described herein, Defendant worked along with Facebook, Google,
11 TikTok, and others to intercept Plaintiff Federman's communications, including those
12 that contained Private Information. Defendant willfully facilitated these interceptions
13 without Plaintiff's knowledge, consent, or express written authorization.
14
15

16 120. Defendant transmitted to third parties Plaintiff Federman's Private
17 Information.
18

19 121. On information and belief, as a "redundant" measure to ensure Plaintiff's
20 Private Information was successfully transmitted to third parties like Facebook,
21 Defendant implemented server-based workarounds like Conversions API to send
22 Plaintiff's Private Information from electronic storage on Defendant's server directly
23 to Facebook.
24

25 122. By doing so without Plaintiff Federman's consent, Defendant breached
26 Plaintiff Federman's right to privacy and unlawfully disclosed Plaintiff Federman's
27 Private Information to third parties.
28

1 **All individuals residing in the United States whose Private Information**
2 **was disclosed to a third party without authorization or consent through**
3 **the Tracking Pixel on Defendant's Website.**

4 129. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its agents, affiliates, parents,
5 subsidiaries, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, any Defendant
6 officer or director, any successor or assign, and any Judge who adjudicates this case,
7 including their staff and immediate family.

9 130. Plaintiff reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the
10 proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 297.
11 Numerosity, Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

13 131. The Class Members for each proposed Class are so numerous that joinder
14 of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are over
15 3,000,000 million individuals whose Private Information may have been improperly
16 accessed by Facebook and/or Google, and the Class is identifiable within Defendant's
17 records.

19 132. Commonality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3). Questions of law and
20 fact common to each Class exist and predominate over any questions affecting only
21 individual Class Members. These include:

- 23 a. Whether and to what extent Defendant had a duty to protect
24 the PII and PHI of Plaintiff and Class Members;
25 b. Whether Defendant had duties not to disclose the PII and PHI
26 of Plaintiff and Class Members to unauthorized third parties;
27
28

- c. Whether Defendant violated its Privacy Policies by disclosing the PII and PHI of Plaintiff and Class Members to Facebook, Google, and/or additional third parties;
- d. Whether Defendant adequately, promptly, and accurately informed Plaintiff and Class Members that their PII and PHI would be disclosed to third parties;
- e. Whether Defendant violated the law by failing to promptly notify Plaintiff and Class Members that their PII and PHI had been compromised;
- f. Whether Defendant adequately addressed and fixed the practices which permitted the disclosure of patient PHI and PII;
- g. Whether Defendant engaged in unfair, unlawful, or deceptive practices by failing to safeguard the PII and PHI of Plaintiff and Class Members;
- h. Whether Defendant violated the consumer protection statutes invoked herein;
- i. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential, and/or nominal damages as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;

- 1 j. Whether Defendant knowingly made false representations as
2 to its data security and/or Privacy Policies practices;
3
4 k. Whether Defendant knowingly omitted material
5 representations with respect to its data security and/or Privacy
6 Policies practices; and,
7
8 l. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to
9 injunctive relief to redress the imminent and currently
10 ongoing harm faced as a result of Defendant's disclosure of
11 their PII and PHI.
12

13 133. Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff's claims are typical of those
14 of other Class Members because he had his PII and PHI compromised as a result of
15 Defendant's incorporation of the Pixel and similar technologies, due to Defendant's
16 misfeasance.
17

18 134. Adequacy, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff will fairly and adequately
19 represent and protect the interests of the Class Members in that Plaintiff has no
20 disabling conflicts of interest that would be antagonistic to those of the other Members
21 of the Class. Plaintiff seeks no relief that is antagonistic or adverse to the Members of
22 the Class and the infringement of the rights and the damages Plaintiff has suffered are
23 typical of other Class Members. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in
24 complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action
25 vigorously.
26
27
28

1 135. Superiority and Manageability, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Class litigation
2 is an appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved.
3
4 Class action treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and
5 efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number
6 of Class Members to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously,
7
8 efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, and expense
9 that hundreds of individual actions would require. Class action treatment will permit
10 the adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain Class Members, who could not
11
12 individually afford to litigate a complex claim against large corporations, like
13 Defendant. Further, even for those Class Members who could afford to litigate such a
14 claim, it would still be economically impractical and impose a burden on the courts.
15

16 136. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class. This class action is also
17 appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds
18 generally applicable to the Class, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform
19 relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class Members and
20 making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole.
21 Defendant's policies challenged herein apply to and affect Class Members uniformly
22 and Plaintiff's challenge of these policies hinges on Defendant's conduct with respect
23 to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff.
24
25

26 137. The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiff and
27 Class Members make the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and
28

1 appropriate procedure to afford relief to Plaintiff and Class Members for the wrongs
2 alleged because Defendant would necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage since
3 they would be able to exploit and overwhelm the limited resources of each individual
4 Class Member with superior financial and legal resources; the costs of individual suits
5 could unreasonably consume the amounts that would be recovered; proof of a
6 common course of conduct to which Plaintiff was exposed is representative of that
7 experienced by the Class and will establish the right of each Class Member to recover
8 on the cause of action alleged; and individual actions would create a risk of
9 inconsistent results and would be unnecessary and duplicative of this litigation.
10
11
12

13 138. The litigation of the claims brought herein is manageable. Defendant's
14 uniform conduct, the consistent provisions of the relevant laws, and the ascertainable
15 identities of Class Members demonstrate that there would be no significant
16 manageability problems with prosecuting this lawsuit as a class action.
17
18

19 139. Adequate notice can be given to Class Members directly using
20 information maintained in Defendant's records.
21

22 140. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant may continue in its
23 failure to properly secure the Private Information of Class Members, Defendant may
24 continue to refuse to provide proper notification to Class Members regarding the
25 practices complained of herein, and Defendant may continue to act unlawfully as set
26 forth in this Complaint.
27
28

1 141. Further, Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
2 applicable to each Class and, accordingly, final injunctive or corresponding
3 declaratory relief with regard to the Class Members as a whole is appropriate under
4 Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5

6 142. Likewise, particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) are appropriate for
7 certification because such claims present only particular, common issues, the
8 resolution of which would advance the disposition of this matter and the parties'
9 interests therein. Such particular issues include, but are not limited to:
10

- 11 a. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to not disclose
12 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information;
13
- 14 b. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to not disclose
15 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information with
16 respect to Defendant's Privacy Policies;
17
- 18 c. Whether Defendant breached a legal duty to Plaintiff and
19 Class Members to exercise due care in collecting, storing,
20 using, and safeguarding their Private Information;
21
- 22 d. Whether Defendant failed to comply with its own policies and
23 applicable laws, regulations, and industry standards relating
24 to data security;
25
26
27
28

- 1 e. Whether Defendant adequately and accurately informed
2 Plaintiff and Class Members that their Private Information
3 would be disclosed to third parties;
4
5 f. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain
6 reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to
7 the nature and scope of the information disclosed to third
8 parties; and,
9
10 g. Whether Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential,
11 and/or nominal damages, and/or injunctive relief as a result of
12 Defendant's wrongful conduct.
13

14 143. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend or modify the Class definition as
15 this case progresses
16

17 **COUNT I**
18 **INVASION OF PRIVACY**
19 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

20 144. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as
21 if fully set forth herein.

22 145. Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information, including their
23 communications with their healthcare provider and sensitive personal and medical data,
24 are private facts that Defendant disclosed to Facebook, Google, TikTok, and others
25 without the knowledge or consent of Plaintiff and Class Members.
26
27
28

1 146. Defendant gave publicity to Plaintiff's and Class Members' private facts
2 and the contents of their communications and other data by sharing them with
3 Facebook, Google, TikTok, and others who in turn view and analyze the information
4 and offers it to its advertising partners. Many of those companies have business models
5 predicated on building massive databases of individual consumer profiles from which
6 to sell targeted advertising and make further disseminations.
7
8

9 147. Plaintiff and Class Members had no knowledge that Defendant was
10 tracking and sharing their private browsing activities and communications because
11 Defendant neither disclosed this activity nor acquired Plaintiff's and Class Members'
12 consent to being tracked on Defendant's website or having their activity on the website
13 disclosed to third parties.
14
15

16 148. Defendant's surreptitious tracking and disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class
17 Members' Private Information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
18 Particularly given that Plaintiff and Class Members were communicating with their
19 healthcare provider and were not informed that a third party advertiser was listening in
20 on their communications and viewing, acquiring, and using their Private Information.
21
22

23 149. In disseminating Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information
24 without their consent in the manner described above, Defendant acted with oppression,
25 fraud, or malice.
26

27 150. Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged by the publication of
28 their Private Information and are entitled to just compensation in the form of actual

1 damages, general damages, unjust enrichment, nominal damages, and punitive
2 damages.

3
4 **COUNT II**
5 **INVASION OF PRIVACY - INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION**
6 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

7
8 151. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as
9 if fully set forth herein.

10 152. Plaintiff and Class Members have an interest in: (1) precluding the
11 dissemination and/or misuse of their sensitive, confidential communications and
12 protected health information; and (2) making personal decisions and/or conducting
13 personal activities without observation, intrusion or interference, including, but not
14 limited to, the right to visit and interact with various internet sites without being
15 subjected to wiretaps without Plaintiff's and Class Members' knowledge or consent.

16
17 153. Plaintiff and Class members had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
18 their communications with Defendant via its website and the communications
19 platforms and services therein.

20
21 154. Plaintiff and Class members communicated sensitive and protected
22 medical information and individually identifiable information that they intended for
23 only Defendant to receive and that they understood Defendant would keep private.

24
25 155. Defendant's disclosure of the substance and nature of those
26 communications to third parties without the knowledge and consent of Plaintiff and
27
28

1 Class members is an intentional intrusion on Plaintiff's and Class members' solitude or
2 seclusion.

3
4 156. Plaintiff and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of privacy
5 given Defendant's Privacy Policy and other representations. Moreover, Plaintiff and
6 Class Members have a general expectation that their communications regarding
7 healthcare with their healthcare providers will kept confidential. Defendant's disclosure
8 of private medical information coupled with individually identifying information is
9 highly offensive to the reasonable person.
10

11
12 157. As a result of Defendant's actions, Plaintiff and Class Members have
13 suffered harm and injury, including but not limited to an invasion of their privacy rights.
14

15 158. Plaintiff and Class members have been damaged as a direct and proximate
16 result of Defendant's invasion of their privacy and are entitled to just compensation,
17 including monetary damages.

18
19 159. Plaintiff and Class Members seek appropriate relief for that injury,
20 including but not limited to damages that will reasonably compensate Plaintiff and
21 Class Members for the harm to their privacy interests as a result of its intrusions upon
22 Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy.
23

24 160. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to punitive damages
25 resulting from the malicious, willful, and intentional nature of Defendant's actions,
26 directed at injuring Plaintiff and Class Members in conscious disregard of their rights.
27
28

1 Such damages are needed to deter Defendant from engaging in such conduct in the
2 future.

3
4 161. Plaintiff also seeks such other relief as the Court may deem just and
5 proper.

6
7 **COUNT III**
8 **BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT**
9 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

10 162. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as
11 if fully set forth herein.

12 163. When Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to
13 Defendant in exchange for services, they entered into an implied contract pursuant to
14 which Defendant agreed to safeguard and not disclose their Private Information
15 without consent.

16
17 164. Plaintiff and Class Members accepted Defendant's offers and provided
18 their Private Information to Defendant.

19
20 165. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted Defendant with
21 their Private Information in the absence of an implied contract between them and
22 Defendant obligating Defendant to not disclose Private Information without consent.

23
24 166. Defendant breached these implied contracts by disclosing Plaintiff's and
25 Class Members' Private Information to third parties, i.e., Facebook and/or Google.

26
27 167. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breaches of these implied
28 contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members sustained damages as alleged herein. Plaintiff

1 and Class Members would not have used Defendant's services, or would have paid
2 substantially for these services, had they known their Private Information would be
3 disclosed.
4

5 168. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to compensatory and
6 consequential damages as a result of Defendant's breach of implied contract.
7

8 **COUNT IV**
9 **BREACH OF CONFIDENCE**
10 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

11 169. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as
12 if fully set forth herein.

13 170. Medical providers have a duty to their patients to keep non-public
14 medical information completely confidential.
15

16 171. Plaintiff and Class Members had reasonable expectations of privacy in
17 their communications exchanged with Defendant, including communications
18 exchanged on Defendant's Website.
19

20 172. Plaintiff's and Class Members' reasonable expectations of privacy in the
21 communications exchanged with Defendant were further buttressed by Defendant's
22 express promises in its Privacy Policies.
23

24 173. Contrary to its duties as a medical provider and its express promises of
25 confidentiality, Defendant deployed the Tracking Pixel to disclose and transmit
26 Plaintiff's Private Information and the contents of their communications exchanged
27 with Defendant to third parties.
28

1 174. The third-party recipients included, but were not limited to, Facebook,
2 Google, TikTok and other online marketers.

3
4 175. Defendant's disclosures of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private
5 Information were made without their knowledge, consent, or authorization, and were
6 unprivileged.

7
8 176. The harm arising from a breach of provider-patient confidentiality
9 includes erosion of the essential confidential relationship between the healthcare
10 provider and the patient.

11
12 177. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's unauthorized disclosures
13 of patient personally identifiable, non-public medical information, and
14 communications, Plaintiff and Class members were damaged by Defendant's breach
15 in that:

- 16
17 a. Sensitive and confidential information that Plaintiff and Class
18 members intended to remain private is no longer private;
19
20 b. Defendant eroded the essential confidential nature of the provider-
21 patient relationship;
22
23 c. Defendant took something of value from Plaintiff and Class
24 members and derived benefit therefrom without Plaintiff's and Class
25 members' knowledge or informed consent and without
26 compensating Plaintiff for the data;
27
28

- 1 d. Plaintiff and Class members did not get the full value of the medical
2 services for which they paid, which included Defendant's duty to
3 maintain confidentiality;
4
5 e. Defendant's actions diminished the value of Plaintiff's and Class
6 members' Private Information; and,
7
8 f. Defendant's actions violated the property rights Plaintiff and Class
9 members have in their Private Information.

10 178. Plaintiff and Class Members are therefore entitled to general damages
11 for invasion of their rights in an amount to be determined by a jury and nominal
12 damages for each independent violation.
13

14 **COUNT V**
15 **VIOLATIONS OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT**
16 **("ECPA")**
17 **18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) *et seq.***
18 **UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE**
19 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

20 179. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as
21 if fully set forth herein.

22 180. The ECPA protects both sending and receipt of communications.

23 181. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides a private right of action to any person
24 whose wire or electronic communications are intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally
25 used in violation of Chapter 119.
26
27
28

1 182. The transmissions of Plaintiff's PII and PHI to Defendant's Website
2 qualifies as a "communication" under the ECPA's definition of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

3
4 183. Electronic Communications. The transmission of PII and PHI between
5 Plaintiff and Class Members and Defendant's Website with which they chose to
6 exchange communications are "transfer[s] of signs, signals, writing,...data, [and]
7 intelligence of [some] nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
8 electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects interstate
9 commerce" and are therefore "electronic communications" within the meaning of 18
10 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
11
12

13 184. Content. The ECPA defines content, when used with respect to
14 electronic communications, to "include[] any information concerning the substance,
15 purport, or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (emphasis added).
16

17 185. Interception. The ECPA defines the interception as the "acquisition of
18 the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
19 electronic, mechanical, or other device" and "contents ... include any information
20 concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. §
21 2510(4), (8).
22
23

24 186. Electronical, Mechanical, or Other Device. The ECPA defines
25 "electronic, mechanical, or other device" as "any device ... which can be used to
26 intercept a[n] ... electronic communication[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5). The following
27 constitute "devices" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5):
28

- 1 a. Plaintiff's and Class Members' browsers;
- 2 b. Plaintiff's and Class Members' computing devices;
- 3 c. Defendant's web-servers; and,
- 4 d. The Pixel Code deployed by Defendant to effectuate the sending
- 5 and acquisition of patient communications
- 6
- 7

8 187. By utilizing and embedding the Pixel on its Website, Defendant
9 intentionally intercepted, endeavored to intercept, and procured another person to
10 intercept, the electronic communications of Plaintiff and Class Members, in violation
11 of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
12

13 188. Specifically, Defendant intercepted Plaintiff's and Class Members'
14 electronic communications via the Tracking Pixel, which tracked, stored, and
15 unlawfully disclosed Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to third
16 parties such Facebook and Google.
17

18 189. Defendant's intercepted communications include, but are not limited to,
19 communications to/from Plaintiff's and Class Members' regarding PII and PHI,
20 treatment, medication, and scheduling.
21

22 190. By intentionally disclosing or endeavoring to disclose the electronic
23 communications of Plaintiff and Class Members to affiliates and other third parties,
24 while knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through
25 the interception of an electronic communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
26 2511(1)(a), Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c).
27
28

1 191. By intentionally using, or endeavoring to use, the contents of the
2 electronic communications of Plaintiff and Class Members, while knowing or having
3 reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of an
4 electronic communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), Defendant violated
5 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(d).
6
7

8 192. Unauthorized Purpose. Defendant intentionally intercepted the contents
9 of Plaintiff's and Class Members' electronic communications for the purpose of
10 committing a tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
11 or of any State – namely, invasion of privacy, among others.
12

13 193. Defendant intentionally used the wire or electronic communications to
14 increase its profit margins. Defendant specifically used the Pixel to track and utilize
15 Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII and PHI for financial gain.
16

17 194. Defendant was not acting under color of law to intercept Plaintiff's and
18 the Class Members' wire or electronic communication.
19

20 195. Plaintiff and Class Members did not authorize Defendant to acquire the
21 content of their communications for purposes of invading Plaintiff's privacy via the
22 Pixel tracking code.
23

24 196. Any purported consent that Defendant received from Plaintiff and Class
25 Members was not valid.
26

27 197. In sending and in acquiring the content of Plaintiff's and Class Members'
28 communications relating to the browsing of Defendant's Website, Defendant's

1 purpose was tortious, criminal, and designed to violate federal and state legal
 2 provisions including a knowing intrusion into a private, place, conversation, or matter
 3 that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
 4

5 **COUNT VI**
 6 **VIOLATION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT**
 7 **UNAUTHORIZED DIVULGENCE BY ELECTRONIC**
 8 **COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a)**
 9 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

10 198. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as
 11 if fully set forth herein.

12 199. The ECPA Wiretap statute provides that “a person or entity providing an
 13 electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the
 14 contents of any communication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent
 15 thereof) while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an
 16 addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee
 17 or intended recipient.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a).
 18

19 200. Electronic Communication Service. An “electronic communication
 20 service” is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send
 21 or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
 22

23 201. Defendant’s Website is an electronic communication service. The
 24 website provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive electronic
 25 communications. In the absence of Defendant’s Website, internet users could not send
 26 or receive communications regarding Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII and PHI.
 27
 28

1 202. Intentional Divulgence. Defendant intentionally designed the Tracking
2 Pixel and was or should have been aware that, if misconfigured, it could divulge
3 Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII and PHI.
4

5 203. While in Transmission. Upon information and belief, Defendant's
6 divulgence of the contents of Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications was
7 contemporaneous with their exchange with Defendant's Digital Platforms, to which
8 they directed their communications.
9

10 204. Defendant divulged the contents of Plaintiff's and Class Members'
11 electronic communications without authorization. Defendant divulged the contents of
12 Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications to Facebook without Plaintiff's and
13 Class Members' consent and/or authorization.
14

15 205. Exceptions do not apply. In addition to the exception for
16 communications directly to an ECS or an agent of an ECS, the Wiretap Act states that
17 "[a] person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may
18 divulge the contents of any such communication as follows:
19
20

- 21 a. "as otherwise authorized in section 2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this title;"
22
23 b. "with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or
24 intended recipient of such communication;"
25
26 c. "to a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to
27 forward such communication to its destination;" or,
28

1 d. “which were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and
2 which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if such
3 divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency.” 18 U.S.C. §
4 2511(3)(b)
5

6 206. Section 2511(2)(a)(i) provides:
7

8 It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or
9 an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic
10 communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire
11 or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
12 communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any
13 activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the
14 protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that
15 a provider of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize
16 service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service
17 quality control checks.

18 207. Defendant’s divulgence of the contents of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’
19 communications on Defendant’s Website to Facebook was not authorized by 18
20 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) in that it was neither: (1) a necessary incident to the rendition
21 of Defendant’s service; nor (2) necessary to the protection of the rights or property of
22 Defendant.
23

24 208. Section 2517 of the ECPA relates to investigations by government
25 officials and has no relevance here.

26 209. Defendant’s divulgence of the contents of user communications on
27 Defendant’s browser through the Pixel code was not done “with the lawful consent of
28 the originator or any addresses or intended recipient of such communication[s].” As

1 alleged above: (a) Plaintiff and Class Members did not authorize Defendant to divulge
2 the contents of their communications; and (b) Defendant did not procure the “lawful
3 consent” from the Websites or apps with which Plaintiff and Class Members were
4 exchanging information.
5

6 210. Moreover, Defendant divulged the contents of Plaintiff and Class
7 Members’ communications through the Tracking Pixel to individuals who are not
8 “person[s] employed or whose facilities are used to forward such communication to
9 its destination.”
10

11 211. The contents of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ communications did not
12 appear to pertain to the commission of a crime and Defendant did not divulge the
13 contents of their communications to a law enforcement agency.
14

15 212. As a result of the above actions and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520, the
16 Court may assess statutory damages; preliminary and other equitable or declaratory
17 relief as may be appropriate; punitive damages in an amount to be determined by a
18 jury; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
19

20
21
22 **COUNT VII**
23 **VIOLATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT (CFAA)**
24 **18 U.S.C. § 1030, *et seq.***
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

25 213. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs as
26 if fully set forth herein.
27
28

1 214. Plaintiff's and the Class's mobile devices are, and at all relevant times
2 have been, used for interstate communication and commerce, and are therefore
3 "protected computers" under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
4

5 215. Defendant exceeded, and continues to exceed, authorized access to the
6 Plaintiff's and the Class's protected computers and obtained information thereby, in
7 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (a)(2)(C).
8

9 216. Defendant's conduct caused "loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year
10 period . . . aggregating at least \$5,000 in value" under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I),
11 *inter alia*, because of the secret transmission of Plaintiff's and the Class's private and
12 personally identifiable data and content – including the Website visitor's electronic
13 communications with the Website, including their mouse movements, clicks,
14 keystrokes (such as text being entered into an information field or text box), URLs of
15 web pages visited, and/or other electronic communications in real-time ("Website
16 Communications") which were never intended for public consumption.
17
18

19 217. Defendant's conduct also constitutes "a threat to public health or safety"
20 under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(IV) due to the Private Information of Plaintiff and
21 the Class being made available to Defendant, Facebook, and/or other third parties
22 without adequate legal privacy protections.
23
24

25 218. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to "maintain a
26 civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief
27 or other equitable relief." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
28

COUNT VIII
VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT
Cal. Pen. Code § 630, *et seq*
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

219. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein and bring this count individually and on behalf of the proposed Class.

220. The California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”) is codified at Cal. Penal Code §§ 630 to 638. The Act begins with its statement of purpose.

The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and technology have led to the development of new devices and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications and that the invasion of privacy resulting from the continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society.

Cal. Penal Code § 630.

221. California Penal Code § 631(a) provides, in pertinent part:

Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner ... willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state; or who uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained, or **who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires** with any person or persons to unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this section, is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars (\$2,500).

222. A defendant must show it had the consent of all parties to a communication.

1 223. At all relevant times, Defendant aided, employed, agreed with, and
2 conspired with Facebook to track and intercept Plaintiff's and Class Members'
3 internet communications while accessing the Digital Platforms. These
4 communications were transmitted to and intercepted by a third party during the
5 communication and without the knowledge, authorization, or consent of Plaintiff and
6 Class Members.
7

8
9 224. Defendant intentionally inserted an electronic device into its website
10 that, without the knowledge and consent of Plaintiff and Class Members, tracked and
11 transmitted the substance of their confidential communications with Defendant to a
12 third party.
13

14 225. Defendant willingly facilitated Facebook's, Google's, TikTok's, and
15 others' interception and collection of Plaintiff's and Class Members' private medical
16 information by embedding the Tracking Pixel on its website.
17

18 226. The following items constitute "machine[s], instrument[s], or
19 contrivance[s]" under the CIPA, and even if they do not, the Tracking Pixel falls under
20 the broad catch-all category of "any other manner":
21

- 22 • The computer codes and programs Defendant used to track Plaintiff's
23 and Class Members' communications while they were navigating the
24 Digital Platforms;
25
- 26 • Plaintiff's and Class Members' browsers;
27
- 28 • Plaintiff's and Class Members' computing and mobile devices;

- 1 • Defendant's web and ad servers;
- 2 • The web and ad-servers from which Third Parties tracked and
- 3 intercepted Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications while they
- 4 were using a web browser to access or navigate the Digital Platforms;
- 5 • The computer codes and programs used by third parties to effectuate
- 6 their tracking and interception of Plaintiff's and Class Members'
- 7 communications while they were using a browser to visit Defendant's
- 8 Digital Platforms ; and
- 9 • The plan Defendant and others carried out to effectuate its tracking and
- 10 interception of Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications while
- 11 they were using a web browser or mobile application to visit
- 12 Defendant's Digital Platforms.

17 227. Defendant fails to disclose that it is using Tracking Pixel specifically to
 18 track and automatically and simultaneously transmit communications to a third party.
 19 Defendant is aware that these communications are confidential as its Privacy Policy
 20 and representations acknowledge the confidential nature of private medical
 21 information and disclaim that it is being shared with unidentified third parties without
 22 Plaintiff's and Class Members' express authorization.

25 228. The patient communication information that Defendant transmits while
 26 using Tracking Pixel constitutes protected health information.
 27

1 229. The Pixel is designed such that it transmits each of the user's actions
2 taken on the webpage to a third party alongside and contemporaneously with the user
3 initiating the communication. Thus, the communication is intercepted in transit to the
4 intended recipient, Defendant and before it reaches Defendant's server.
5

6 230. As demonstrated hereinabove, Defendant violates CIPA by aiding and
7 permitting third parties to receive its patients' online communications in real time
8 through its website without their consent.
9

10 231. By disclosing Plaintiff's and Class Members' private health information,
11 Defendant violated Plaintiff's and Class Members' statutorily protected right to
12 privacy.
13

14 232. As a result of the above violations and pursuant to CIPA Section 637.2,
15 Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and Class Members for treble actual damages
16 related to their loss of privacy in an amount to be determined at trial or for statutory
17 damages in the amount of \$5,000 per violation. Section 637.2 specifically states that
18 "[it] is not a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that the
19 plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages."
20
21

22 233. Under the statute, Defendant is also liable for reasonable attorney's fees,
23 litigation costs, injunctive and declaratory relief, and punitive damages in an amount
24 to be determined by a jury, but sufficient to prevent the same or similar conduct by
25 the Defendant in the future.
26
27
28

COUNT IX
Violation Of The Unfair Competition Law
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.*
(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

234. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

235. Plaintiff brings his claim for injunctive relief as he has no confidence that Defendant has altered its privacy practices and he may wish to use Defendant's services in the future.

236. Plaintiff brings his claim for restitution in the alternative to his claims for damages.

237. California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") prohibits any "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

238. Defendant engaged in unlawful business practices in connection with its disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to unrelated third parties, including Facebook, in violation of the UCL.

239. The acts, omissions, and conduct of Defendant as alleged herein constitute "business practices" within the meaning of the UCL.

240. The acts, omissions, and conduct of Defendant as alleged herein emanated and was directed from Defendant's California headquarters.

1 241. The acts, omissions, and conduct of Defendant as alleged herein
2 constitute “business practices” within the meaning of the UCL.
3

4 242. Defendant violated the “unlawful” prong of the UCL by violating, inter
5 alia, Plaintiff’s and Class Member’s constitutional rights to privacy, state and federal
6 privacy statutes, and state consumer protection statutes, such as HIPAA, CIPA, the
7 ECPA, and the CFAA as pleaded above.
8

9 243. Defendant’s acts, omissions, and conduct also violate the unfair prong of
10 the UCL because those acts, omissions, and conduct, as alleged herein, offended
11 public policy (including the aforementioned federal and state privacy statutes and
12 state consumer protection statutes, such as HIPAA and CIPA, the ECPA, and CFAA,
13 and constitute immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous activities that caused
14 substantial injury, including to Plaintiff and Class Members.
15
16

17 244. Plaintiff viewed and relied upon Defendant’s representations concerning
18 the confidentiality of information provided by Plaintiff and Class Members to
19 Defendant. Had Defendant disclosed that it shared Private Information with third
20 parties, Plaintiff would not have purchased Defendant’s services or would have paid
21 considerably less for those services.
22
23

24 245. The harm caused by the Defendant’s conduct outweighs any potential
25 benefits attributable to such conduct and there were reasonably available alternatives
26 to further Defendant’s legitimate business interests other than Defendant’s conduct
27 described herein.
28

1 E. Award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as permitted by law; and

2 F. Enter such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

3
4 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

5 Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the proposed Class, demands a trial by
6 jury for all of the claims asserted in this Complaint so triable.

7
8
9 Dated: March 10, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

10 s/ John J. Nelson

11 John J. Nelson (SBN 317598)

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